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NOTE
The Lack of Deference to Medical Opinions in
Adjudicating Social Security Disability
Claims
AMRITA MAHARAJt
INTRODUCTION
Becoming a doctor is not easy. It typically requires four
years of undergraduate school, four years of medical school,
and three to seven years of professional training in a
residency program.' For those who want to become highly
specialized in a certain field, e.g. gastroenterology, add on
another one to three years for a fellowship.' The American
Medical Association must therefore believe that extensive
training is required to enable one to diagnose and treat
people.
Interestingly enough, Administrative Law Judges
("ALJs") for the Social Security Administration ("SSA') do
t J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A. in Economics,
2008, Cornell University. Thank you to Gary Pernice, Esq., for hiring me as a
paralegal in the field of Social Security disability law and cultivating my passion
for the law. Thank you also to Thomas Katsiotas, my fianc6, my very best friend,
and my law school classmate-I cannot imagine taking this law school journey
without him. Thank you to my editor, Jaclyn Silver, and all of the other members
of the Buffalo Law Reuiew for their hard work in preparing my Note for
publication. Last but certainly not least, I am deeply grateful for the endless love
and support of my parents and my brother.
1. Requirements for Becoming a Physician, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page (last visited Nov.
10, 2014).
2. Id.
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work very similar to that of doctors, but without any
comparable training. In evaluating a claim for Social
Security disability benefits3 , an ALJ evaluates the claimant's
medical records and the "intensity, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects"' 4 of the claimant's symptoms to
determine if the claimant is disabled and unable to work.5 In
fact, one may argue that an ALJ is better qualified than a
doctor to evaluate an individual's medical condition and
degree of disability because, according to SSA, an ALJ is free
to discredit a doctor's diagnosis or medical opinion if the AIU
feels that the doctor's opinion is not, in the ALJ's opinion,
"well- supported" by "medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques. '"6
How can this make any sense? This system does actually
make some sense if you consider the safeguard that SSA had
built into the disability determination process. I use the past
tense "had" because, effective March 26, 2012, SSA amended
the Code of Federal Regulations ("Regulations") to reflect
new rules governing the collection and consideration of
evidence of disability.7 With the amendment came removal of
the safeguard, a safeguard that actually needed
strengthening rather than total removal. To understand the
safeguard, consider the following hypothetical.
Charlie, a forty-nine-year-old man who has been working
as a carpenter for thirty years, injures his back badly on the
job. Charlie undergoes surgery, but even after surgery, he is
unable to work. He files for Social Security disability benefits,
and after appearing at a hearing before an ALJ, the AU
3. For the purposes of this Note, I will use the phrase "Social Security
disability benefits" to encompass both disability benefits provided under the
Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") program as well as benefits
provided under Supplemental Security Insurance ("SSI"). The programs differ in
that eligibility for SSDI is contingent on having worked for a certain duration and
having paid Social Security taxes. SSI eligibility is based on financial need and
does not require that an individual paid any Social Security taxes. See Benefits
for People with Disabilities, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability (last
visited Nov. 10, 2014).
4. SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34483, 34484 (July 2, 1996).
5. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (2014).
6. SSR 96-2p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34489, 34490 (July 2, 1996).
7. See How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 77 Fed. Reg.
10651 (Feb. 23, 2012).
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denies his claim. Even though the medical evidence included
a medical opinion from his orthopedic surgeon that Charlie
was unable to perform the minimum sitting, standing, and
walking needed to perform full-time, competitive work on a
sustained basis, the ALJ rejected the doctor's opinion. In his
decision, the ALJ reasoned that the opinion was not well
enough supported by objective clinical findings such as a
positive straight-leg raising test, limitation of motion of the
spine, and sensory or reflex loss. The ALJ further reasoned
that the doctor's opinion was entitled to little weight because
it was inconsistent with the doctor's treatment records
wherein the doctor noted that Charlie was recovering well
from surgery.
Prior to March 26, 2012, the ALJ would have had to first
recontact Charlie's doctor to offer him the opportunity to
provide additional evidence or clarification of his medical
opinion before the ALJ was lawfully permitted to reject the
opinion Such protocol reflected the non-adversarial nature
of Social Security proceedings and the affirmative duty that
all ALJs have to develop a full and fair case record.' It also
reflected SSA's proclaimed respect for the superiority of
evidence from a claimant's own medical source over other
evidence. SSA's Regulations detail how a claimant's treating
sources' opinions are generally entitled to more weight than
other opinion evidence because
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to
provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
8. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1) (1996), amended by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)
(2014) ("We will seek additional evidence or clarification from your medical source
when the report from your medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that
must be resolved, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or
does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.").
9. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) ("Social Security proceedings are
inquisitorial rather than adversarial .... The regulations make this nature of SSA
proceedings quite clear. They expressly provide that the SSA 'conducts the
administrative review process in an informal, nonadversary manner."') (quoting
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (1999)).
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findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. 10
Thus, developing the evidence by recontacting a
claimant's medical source before taking any other actions to
develop the evidence was mandated whenever the record
contained an insufficiency or inconsistency that prevented
the ALJ from making a decision on disability. " As a result of
the amendment though, Charlie's AU would now be free to
use his discretion in determining when, or if, to give Charlie's
orthopedic surgeon the opportunity to clarify his opinion
before rejecting it. 2
The amendment destroys the fundamental safeguard
against an ALJ playing doctor. No longer do ALJs have any
obligation to defer first and foremost to professional medical
opinions in evaluating disability claims. 3 An ALJ can
interpret medical evidence as he so chooses and can decide
how to resolve insufficiencies or inconsistencies in any
number of ways, including ordering that the claimant
undergo a consultative examination that would be performed
by a doctor hired and paid by SSA1 4. Giving ALJs this freedom
sends a clear message to them: SSA is de-emphasizing the
importance of a claimant's medical sources. Further, SSA is
empowering ALJs with a false sense of competence; ALJs are
not licensed medical professionals though and they should
not be acting as such. The fact that ALJs continue to
adjudicate disability claims incorrectly, thus resulting in a
high volume of remands, shows us that ALJs need more, not
less, guidance. Selian v. Astrue is a recent example of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reiterating once again that ALJs need to stop substituting
10. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2013).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1) (1996), amended by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)
(2014).
12. See 77 Fed. Reg. 10651.
13. Id.
14. See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security's
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 189, 222-23
(2007).
210 [Vol. 63
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their lay opinions into their analyses. 5 Further, while some
ALJs' failures in properly developing records of evidence can
be attributed to their misunderstanding of the situations
requiring recontact, other ALJs' failures can be attributed to
anti-claimant bias and/or a false sense of competency, as
evidenced by SSA's recent settlement in Padro v. Astrue.16
For these reasons, SSA erred in amending the recontact
Regulation to provide ALJs with even more discretion.
In Part I of my Note, I will provide an overview of the
Social Security disability adjudication process. I will explain
each of the regimented steps that an ALJ must follow to
determine whether a claimant is disabled and deserving of
Social Security disability benefits. Part II will be a case study
of the Second Circuit's decision in Selian v. Astrue. I will walk
you through the plaintiffs journey of trying to secure
disability benefits, outlining the various decisions made on
his case and paying special attention to the Second Circuit's
rationale in vacating the district court's decision, which had
affirmed the ALJ's decision. In Part III, I will analyze Selian
v. Astrue through the lens of its unintended consequences: (1)
it showcases why aspects of SSA's rationale for changing the
recontact Regulation from a mandatory provision to a
permissive one are both illogical and unreasonable; and (2) it
encourages ALJs to play doctor even more than they already
have been. I will also describe why, apart from Selian v.
Astrue, every aspect of SSA's rationale does not hold water.
A discussion of SSA's recent settlement in connection with
Padro v. Astrue will additionally serve to support my
contentions. Finally, I will document my proposals for reform
and the expected advantages the system will gain should it
institute my proposals.
I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION PROCESS:
How Do THEY Do IT?
A total of 14,249,000 people are receiving Social Security
disability benefits, according to January 2014 statistics from
15. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 419-20 (2d Cir. 2013).
16. No. 11-CV-1788 (CBA) (RLM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150494, at *3-4
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013).
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SSA.'7 SSA also paid out a total of over fourteen billion
dollars to those individuals in January 2014.18 If you want a
piece of that multi-million dollar pie, you must prove to SSA
that you are disabled.
Before I dive into the five-step sequential evaluation,
which is the method that SSA employs to determine
disability, I should define "disability" as per the Regulations.
"[D]isability [is] the inability to do any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months."1 9 Substantial gainful
activity is work that involves "significant physical or mental
activities" and that is done for pay or profit.2 °
The five-step sequential evaluation begins with a
determination of whether the claimant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity.21 Technically, a claimant may be
working and may still not be performing substantial gainful
activity.22 This is so as long as the claimant is earning less
than a specified amount.23 SSA has provided earnings
guidelines to determine whether a claimant's work is
substantial: for example, for calendar year 2014, monthly
earnings of more than $1,070 counted as substantial.24 If a
claimant is found to be engaging in substantial gainful
activity, the sequential evaluation ceases at this first step,
17. Quick Facts regarding Social Security Benefits Payouts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat-snapshot/2014-0l.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014).
18. Id. at Table 2 & 3.
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (2014).
20. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a) (2014).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) (2014).
22. SSR 83-33: Titles II & XVI: Determining Whether Work is Substantial
Gainful Activity-Employees, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1983), http://www.socialsecurity.
gov/OPHome/rulings/di/03/SSR83-33-di-03.html.
23. Id.
24. Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"), DI 10501.015 Tables of
SGA Earnings Guidelines and Effective Dates Based on Year of Work Activity,
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0410501015 (last
updated Nov. 1, 2013).
212 [Vol. 63
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and the claimant is deemed not disabled.25 Otherwise, the
evaluation proceeds to the second step.26
At the second step, SSA evaluates the severity of the
claimant's medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s).27 Medically determinable impairments result
from "anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities" and can be established by "medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 28
Some examples of diagnostic techniques include chemical
tests, electrophysiological studies such as electrocardiograms
and electroencephalograms, roentgenological studies such as
x-rays, and psychological tests.29 After SSA concludes that
the claimant has at least one medically determinable
impairment, the impairment is analyzed to determine its
severity.30 The claimant must have an impairment or a
combination of impairments that is severe.3 An impairment
is "severe" if it has more than a "minimal effect on an
individual's physical or mental ability(ies) to do basic work
activities. 32 Basic work activities include, but are not limited
to: walking; standing; sitting; lifting; pushing; pulling;
reaching; carrying; understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions; and responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work
situations.33 The impairment must also satisfy a durational
requirement-"[u]nless [the] impairment is expected to
result in death, it must have lasted or must be expected to
25. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
26. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
27. Id.
28. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (2014).
29. POMS, DI 24501.020 Symptoms, Signs, and Laboratory Findings, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0424501020 (last updated Aug.
9, 2012).
30. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
31. Id.
32. SSR 85-28: Title 11 & XVI: Medical Impairments that are not Severe, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. (1985), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OPHome/rulings/di/01/SSR85
-28-di-01.html.
33. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (2014).
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last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 34 A
claimant who successfully establishes that he suffers from a
severe impairment or combination of impairments proceeds
to the third step of the sequential evaluation.35
While the first and seconds steps of the sequential
evaluation are essentially "minimum requirements" for a
finding of disability, the third step is the first step where a
claimant may win his case outright. If a claimant succeeds at
this step, he is disabled and entitled to benefits; the
sequential evaluation would thus cease here.3 6 If the claimant
cannot succeed at this step, he may proceed to the fourth
step.
To succeed at the third step of the sequential evaluation,
the claimant must establish that his impairment meets or
equals37 one of SSA's Listings of Impairments ("Listings").38
The Listings include a wide range of impairments that SSA
"consider[s] severe enough to prevent an individual from
doing any gainful activity."39 The Listings cover impairments
from categories including the musculoskeletal system,
special senses and speech, respiratory system,
cardiovascular system, digestive system, genitourinary
impairments, hematological disorders, skin disorders,
endocrine disorders, congenital disorders that affect multiple
body systems, neurological conditions, mental disorders,
malignant neoplastic diseases, and immune system
34. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (2014).
35. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii).
36. Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, Listing of Impairments, Soc.
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionalsbluebook/listing-
impairments.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
37. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a) (2014) (indicating that an impairment "is medically
equivalent to a listed impairment in appendix 1 if it is at least equal in severity
and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment").
38. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
39. Disability Evaluation under Social Security, Listing of Impairments, Soc.
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/listing-
impairments.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
214 [Vol. 63
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disorders. ° If SSA finds that a claimant's impairment does
not meet or equal one of the Listings, the evaluation proceeds
to step four of the sequential evaluation, which requires
consideration of the claimant's ability to perform his past
relevant work.
To perform the evaluation at step four, SSA must first
assess the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 42
A claimant's RFC is the most that he can still do despite his
physical or mental limitations. 43 The RFC assessment is then
used to determine if the claimant can perform his past
relevant work,44 which is work that the claimant did within
the past fifteen years that was substantial gainful activity
and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do
it.45 If SSA determines that the claimant can perform his past
relevant work, the claimant is found not disabled.46 To make
such a determination, sometimes SSA utilizes the services of
a vocational expert who "may offer relevant evidence within
his or her expertise or knowledge concerning the physical and
mental demands of a claimant's past relevant work. 47 If the
claimant is deemed unable to perform his past relevant work,
the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step of the
sequential evaluation. 8
At the fifth step of the sequential evaluation, SSA
determines whether the claimant, even despite all of his
limitations, can adjust to other work in the national
40. Disability Evaluation under Social Security, Adult Listings, SOC. SECURITY
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionalsbluebooklAdultListings.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
42. SSR 9 6 -8p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II & XVI: Assessing Residual
Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1996),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OPHome/rulings/di/Ol/SSR96-08-di-O l.html.
43. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2014).
44. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b) (2014).
45. Id. § 404.1560(b)(1).
46. Id. § 404.1560(b)(3).
47. Id. § 404.1560(b)(2).
48. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
2015] 215
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economy.49 SSA considers the claimant's RFC, age, education,
and work experience." The proposed work must exist in
"significant numbers in the national economy."'" A claimant
who prevails at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation is
disabled and entitled to benefits.
II. SELIAN V. ASTRUE: THE ROAD TO SECURING A REMAND
Robert Selian ("Selian") worked from 1980 until 2000
doing a range of unskilled and physically taxing jobs.52 Take,
for example, his job as a delivery driver.53 That job had a
minimum lifting requirement of seventy-five pounds.54 Selian
also worked as a road painter, which required him to lift a
spray painter weighing about one hundred pounds onto a
truck.5 After twenty years and with only a GED, Selian
began searching for less physically demanding work because
his physical strength was declining, particularly his lifting
ability. 6 From 2001 to 2006, Selian worked various part-
time, unskilled jobs, but Selian's diminishing physical
capacity forced him to discontinue each of those jobs. For
example, Selian worked as a gas station attendant until he
could no longer lift car hoods or squeeze gas pump handles."
Selian filed his claim for Social Security disability
benefits on February 8, 2007, alleging disability as of June
30, 2001.58 While I cannot be sure, I am fairly certain that
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 404.1560(c)(1).
52. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 2013).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Selian v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-1400 (GLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, at
*1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012). Note that even though Selian continued to work part-
time until 2006, Selian alleged in his application for benefits that he was disabled
since 2001. Id. As explained in Part I, an individual can be found disabled for a
period of time during which he worked as long as the individual's work does not
216 [Vol. 63
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Selian did not expect to be litigating his case--over six years
after he filed it-before United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.59 Moreover, I am even more certain that
Selian did not imagine that the Second Circuit would simply
remand his case back to an ALJ for a do-over.60 Selian may
have expected though to have his case denied at the initial
level of review, which it was on April 20, 2007.61 For disabled-
worker applicants who filed claims between 2002 and 2010,
approximately 74% of them were denied at the initial level of
review.62 Luckily for Selian, New York is one of the few states
where the first level of appeal is requesting a hearing before
an ALJ.63 In most states, the first level of appeal is to request
reconsideration.64 Notably, at the reconsideration level, about
97% of claims were denied between 2002 and 2010.65
Skipping the reconsideration level, Selian appealed his
initial denial to the hearing level and appeared at a disability
hearing before an AU_2 on April 29, 2009.66 Before I discuss
the ALJ's findings and conclusions, it is important that I
recount Selian's treatment history and the evidence in the
record before the ALJ at the time he decided to deny Selian's
claim.
Selian began seeing Dr. Mark Corey in January 2007.
Selian explained to Dr. Corey that he was experiencing
"chronic pain in both shoulders, shortness of breath, and
constitute substantial gainful activity, for which there is a threshold earnings
requirement. See SSR 83-33, supra note 22.
59. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 422.
61. Id. at 416.
62. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2012, SSA PUB. No. 13-11826, 143 (2013),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di-asr/2012/di-asrl2.pdf.
[hereinafter SOC. SEC. ADMIN.].
63. Michael J. Astrue, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Statement Before the
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security (June 27, 2012),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony-062712.html.
64. Id.
65. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 62.
66. Selian v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-1400 (GLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, at
*1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012).
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'severe' fatigue."67 Based on his examination, Dr. Corey
diagnosed Selian with bilateral rotator cuff tendinitis and
probable epicondylitis. 68 At that time, Dr. Corey administered
injections of Lidocaine and Depo-Medrol.69 The following
month, Dr. Corey prescribed Celebrex for Selian's continued
shoulder pain and recommended that Selian see an
orthopedist. 0
A couple months after Selian filed his application for
disability benefits, SSA requested that Selian attend two
consultative examinations. These examinations were
performed by doctors that are paid by SSA to perform one-
time examinations. 1 Upon examination, Dr. Naughten, the
physical consultative examiner, noted that Selian "walked
with a stiff gait and was 'unbalanced' when walking on his
heels and toes."72 Significant clinical findings also included
limited range of motion of the shoulders, reduced sensitivity
to touch and pain in both shoulders at the acromioclavicular
("AC") joints, and reduced grip strength."3 Diagnostic findings
included an x-ray of the left shoulder that suggested the
"possibility of rotator cuff impingement syndrome. 74
Regarding Selian's RFC, Dr. Naughten opined that "Selian
would have no limitations in his ability to see, hear, talk, sit,
or stand, but would have moderate limitations in walking,
climbing stairs, pushing, pulling, and reaching."75 Dr.
Naughten further opined that Selian "could lift and carry 'a
mild degree of weight on an intermittent basis.' 7 6 A
67. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 2013).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 412-13.
72. Id. at 412.
73. Id. at 413.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
218 [Vol. 63
ADJUDICATING SOCIAL SECURITY
psychological consultative examiner also examined Selian
and diagnosed him with a depressive disorder.77
Selian continued to treat with Dr. Corey. By Selian's May
30, 2007 appointment, Selian had developed upper back
spasms.7" Physical examination was significant for "marked
muscular tenderness posteriorly. ' 79 Dr. Corey diagnosed
"[f]ibromyalgia-type pain."80 On September 4, 2007, Dr. Corey
affirmed a diagnosis of fibromyalgia.8' Dr. Corey provided a
detailed RFC assessment on July 24, 2008.82 The Second
Circuit summarized his opinion as follows:
[Dr. Corey] indicated a diagnosis of fibromyalgia and possible
rotator-cuff tendinitis, noting that Selian's "condition is largely
subjective in nature." Corey opined that Selian would need to take
rest breaks of more than one 10 minutes rest period per hour while
working. He also stated that Selian could not sit for six or more
hours a day and could stand for at least two hours in an eight-hour
workday. He explained that Selian's medication would affect his
concentration and ability to sustain a work pace "at least
moderately."
83
Finally, it should be noted that after Selian's hearing, but
before the ALJ's decision, the ALJ ordered that Selian attend
a rheumatological consultative examination by Dr. Dura. 4
Upon examination, Dr. Dura noted that Selian exhibited
"numerous soft tissue tender points" and "appear[ed] to have
fibromyalgia syndrome" and "perhaps early degenerative
arthritis."85
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 414.
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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A. The Lower Courts'Analyses
The ALJ issued a decision dated July 23, 2009 denying
Selian's claim. 6 Selian successfully made it past the first step
of the sequential evaluation.87 At step two though, the ALJ
bifurcated the period for which Selian alleged disability. The
ALJ found that prior to January 26, 2007, the date upon
which Selian began treating with Dr. Corey, Selian had no
medically determinable impairments.8 But, since January
26, 2007, the ALJ found that Selian had been suffering from
two severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the
shoulders and a mood disorder.8 9 Notably, the ALJ failed to
find fibromyalgia a severe impairment despite the diagnosis
from Selian's treating physician, Dr. Corey, and from the
rheumatological consultative examiner, Dr. Dura.90
After finding that neither of Selian's severe impairments
met or equaled a Listing, the ALJ assessed Selian's RFC. The
Second Circuit summarized the ALJ's RFC assessment as
follows:
[The ALJ] found that [Selian] could lift and carry up to 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and that, during an eight-
hour workday, Selian had no limitations on standing or sitting and
could walk for a total of two hours. The ALJ further found that
Selian could only occasionally push, pull, and reach in all
directions. With respect to Selian's mental limitations, the ALJ
found that Selian could understand, carry out, and remember
simple instructions; respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and usual work situations; and deal with changes in his
routine work setting. The AU therefore concluded that Selian
could perform "light work" as defined in the Social Security
regulations.
91
In evaluating Selian's RFC, the ALJ accorded the
"greatest weight" to the opinions of the consultative
86. Selian v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-1400 (GLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, at
*1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012).
87. See Selian, 708 F.3d at 416.
88. Id. at 416.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
220 [Vol. 63
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examiners because the ALJ deemed those opinions consistent
with the record's clinical and diagnostic evidence. 92
Regarding the opinion of Selian's treating physician, Dr.
Corey, the AIJ discredited it on the grounds that she found
it was "inconsistent with diagnostic studies, clinical findings
and the reports of other physicians participating in [Selian's]
health care."93
Based on the ALJ's RFC assessment, the ALJ denied
Selian's claim at step five of the sequential evaluation,
finding that there were "jobs existing in significant numbers
in the national economy" that Selian could perform.9 4 Selian
requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals
Council, but the Appeals Council denied the request. 5 As the
Appeals Council denied Selian's request, the ALJ's decision
became "the final decision of the [Social Security]
Commissioner. 96  Selian appealed the Commissioner's
decision to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York, contending that the ALJ failed to
properly assess the medical evidence and failed to properly
determine his RFC.97 The District Court, however, was
unconvinced. 98 In his opinion affirming the ALJ's decision,
Chief United States District Court Judge Gary Sharpe
reminded us that "the Social Security Administration
considers the data that physicians provide but draws its own
conclusions as to whether those data indicate disability."99
Selian appealed the District Court's decision to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. 00
92. Selian v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-1400 (GLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, at
*8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012).
93. Id. at *7.
94. Selian, 708 F.3d at 417.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Selian, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, at *2.
98. Id. at *9.
99. Id. at *6 (quoting Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)).
100. Selian, 708 F.3d at 411.
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B. The Second Circuit's Analysis: Selian v. Astrue
Selian had a number of grounds for appealing the
District Court's decision.' 0' For the purposes of this Note, I
will focus on two of his arguments. Those arguments are: (1)
the ALJ erred in finding Selian's fibromyalgia was not a
severe impairment; and (2) the ALJ's RFC assessment was
not supported by substantial evidence. 02 The Second Circuit
agreed with Selian on both of those points and ordered that
the District Court's judgment be vacated and that the case be
remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion. 103 The Second
Circuit's analysis demonstrates the failure of the lower
courts to give proper deference to the opinions of licensed
medical professionals and especially those who had a treating
relationship with Selian.
1. "[T]he ALJ improperly disregarded the diagnosis of
Selian's treating physician, . . . improperly substituted her
own medical judgments[,] and confused and misstated the
medical evidence.'"0 4 The opinion of a claimant's treating
physician is a critical piece of evidence in any Social Security
disability claim. As stated earlier, the Regulations instruct
that treating physician opinions are generally entitled to
more weight than other opinion evidence because
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to
provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. 05
Moreover, a treating physician's opinion is entitled to
controlling weight in evaluating a disability claim where that
opinion is "well-supported and not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in the case record;" under those
101. Id. at 412.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 422.
104. Id. at 418.
105. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2013).
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circumstances, SSA mandates that the opinion "must be
adopted."'' 06
The Second Circuit has cautioned ALJs that they cannot
summarily dismiss a treating physician's opinion; they must
consider specific factors 07 in evaluating the opinion, and they
must "comprehensively set forth [their] reasons for the
weight assigned to a treating physician's opinion."''0 The
Second Circuit has also warned ALJs about playing doctor:
[Tihe ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for
competent medical opinion. .. . [W]hile an [ALJ] is free to resolve
issues of credibility as to lay testimony or to choose between
properly submitted medical opinions, he is not free to set his own
expertise against that of a physician who [submitted an opinion to
or] testified before him.
10 9
Here, the Second Circuit found the ALJ's rationale for
discrediting Dr. Corey's opinion that Selian suffered from
fibromyalgia thin."' The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Corey's
diagnosis was inconsistent with the record because Dr.
Corey's notes stated that Selian's "response to prednisone is
curious and not suggestive of fibromyalgia although [he]
clinically appears to have [it]-advised strongly to see
106. SSR 9 6 -2p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles 1I and XVI: Giving
Controlling Weight to Treating Source Medical Opinions, Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (July
2, 1996), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OPHome/rulings/di/O1/SSR96-02-di-
01.html.
107. Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The ALJ must
consider, inter alia, the '[1length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination'; the '[niature and extent of the treatment relationship'; the
'relevant evidence . . . particularly medical signs and laboratory findings,'
supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole;
and whether the physician is a specialist in the area covering the particular
medical issues." (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii),
(3) (2008)).
108. Id. at 129 (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004));
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) ("We will always give good reasons in our notice
of determination for the weight we give your treating source's opinion.").
109. Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)
(quoting McBrayer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.
1983)).
110. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2013).
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rheumatology."' The ALJ also concluded that Dr. Corey's
diagnosis of "fibromyalgia" differed from Dr. Dura's diagnosis
of "fibromyalgia syndrome."" 2  Regarding Dr. Corey's
comment about Selian's response to prednisone, the Second
Circuit zeroed in on the fact that the ALJ "made no effort to
reconcile this apparent inconsistency."'"I3 Further, the Second
Circuit faulted the ALJ for her failure to explain why she
concluded that a "fibromyalgia" diagnosis and a
"fibromyalgia syndrome" diagnosis were different, noting
"this failure was especially problematic considering that Dr.
Dura's letter appears to concur with Dr. Corey's diagnosis.""
4
The Second Circuit also found fault in the ALJ's reliance
on the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Naughten, who
did not diagnose fibromyalgia. 115 "We have previously
cautioned that ALJs should not rely heavily on the findings
of consultative physicians after a single examination.""' 6
Again, the Second Circuit took issue with the ALJ's failure to
"reconcile the contradiction or grapple with Dr. Corey's
diagnosis.,' 7
Finally, the Second Circuit found that "the ALJ
improperly substituted her own criteria as to what is
necessary to establish a fibromyalgia diagnosis without
support from medical testimony.""' 8 The ALJ contended that
the record lacked evidence of the requisite symptoms
111. Id. at 419 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[I]n evaluating
a claimant's disability, a consulting physician's opinions or report should be given
limited weight. . . . This is justified because 'consultative exams are often brief,
are generally performed without benefit or review of claimant's medical history
and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day. Often,
consultative reports ignore or give only passing consideration to subjective
symptoms without stated reasons."' (quoting Torres v. Bowen, 700 F. Supp. 1306,
1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))).
117. Selian, 708 F.3d at 419.
118. Id.
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associated with fibromyalgia. 119 But the Second Circuit
refuted this claim and found that the ALJ's conclusion
"overlooked the facts in the record and, more egregiously,
constituted an improper substitution by the ALJ of her own
lay opinion in place of medical testimony."'20 Specifically, the
Second Circuit pointed to various clinical findings in the
record from both Dr. Corey and Dr. Dura that supported a
fibromyalgia diagnosis such as the presence of "tender
points."'' The Second Circuit ordered that, on remand, the
proper weight to give to Dr. Corey's opinion must be
determined, and it reminded that the ALJ has "an
affirmative duty to 'fill any clear gaps in the administrative
record' before rejecting a treating physician's diagnosis. '"122
2. "Dr. Naughten's opinion is remarkably vague.... At a
minimum, the ALJ likely should have contacted [him] and
sought clarification of his report. ,23 As evidenced above, the
Second Circuit took issue with the ALJ's failure to make any
effort to develop the record of evidence by simply recontacting
Selian's treating physician, Dr. Corey, to resolve the ALJ's
perceived inconsistencies. It should be noted, though, that an
ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record as it
pertains to treating physician opinions and other opinions
such as those from one-time examiners. 2 4 This affirmative
duty serves to discourage ALJs from relying on their own lay
assumptions.
When medical opinions are vague or susceptible to more
than one meaning, the Second Circuit has especially stressed
the importance of recontacting the author of the opinion.
Otherwise, an ALJ may fall into the all too easy trap of
overreaching her bounds and superimposing her own opinion
on that of the author. In Curry v. Apfel, the Second Circuit
found that an opinion that a claimant's lifting ability was
"moderate" and his sitting ability was "mild" was "so vague
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 419-20.
122. Id. at 420 (quoting Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008)).
123. Id. at 421.
124. See Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).
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as to render it useless in evaluating whether [the claimant]
can perform sedentary work."'25 In that case, the ALJ used
that opinion as a basis for finding the claimant able to
perform sedentary work. 126 The Second Circuit rejected the
ALJ's reliance on the opinion, holding that "[the doctor's] use
of the terms 'moderate' and 'mild,' without additional
information, does not permit the ALJ, a layperson
notwithstanding her considerable and constant exposure to
medical evidence, to make the necessary inference that [the
claimant] can perform the exertional requirements of
sedentary work."'27
Here, in Selian, the Second Circuit found that the ALJ's
reliance on Dr. Naughten's opinion that Selian "should be
able to lift . . . objects of a mild degree of weight on an
intermittent basis" was improper. 28 The Second Circuit
explained that the ALJ had no way of actually knowing what
Dr. Naughten meant by "mild degree" and "intermittent"; in
other words, the ALJ's interpretation was "sheer
speculation."'129 Based on the ALJ's failure to recontact Dr.
Naughten and obtain clarification of his report, the Second
Circuit ruled that the ALJ's RFC assessment was not
supported by substantial evidence. 130
The Second Circuit's holding in Selian speaks to the
importance of recontacting medical sources when their
opinions appear inconsistent or vague. But how can we
reconcile this with SSA's amendment to the Regulations,
which speaks to the unimportance of such recontacting?
III. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SELIAN V. ASTRUE
The unintended consequences of the Second Circuit's
holding in Selian cannot be understated. As a result of the
decision, SSA's rationale for amending the recontact
requirement is directly contradicted. Further, Selian
125. 209 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Selian, 708 F.3d at 421.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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demonstrates why the recontact amendment encourages
ALJs to play doctor even more than they already have been.
A. Recontact Requirements Before and After the
Amendment and Why SSA Claims They Had
To Do What They Did
Before SSA's amendment to the recontact Regulation,
ALJs were required to recontact a claimant's medical source
when the source provided evidence that contained a conflict
or ambiguity.'3 1 Notably, this requirement was in effect at the
time the ALJ denied Selian's claim.'32  Despite the
requirement, Selian's ALJ and many others throughout the
country failed to comply with it in the adjudication of
disability claims, as noted by the Second Circuit. 33 Time and
time again, ALJs have rejected the opinions of claimants'
medical sources when the ALJs perceived some sort of
inconsistency or ambiguity without abiding by their
affirmative duties to recontact the sources for further
information and/or clarification. 114
SSA responded to the flood of remands based on failures
to recontact medical sources by changing the mandatory
131. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e) (2011) (amended by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2012))
("When the evidence we receive from your treating physician or psychologist or
other medical source is inadequate for us to determine whether you are disabled,
we will need additional information to reach a determination or a decision. ... We
will first recontact your treating physician or psychologist or other medical source
to determine whether the additional information we need is readily available. We
will seek additional evidence or clarification from your medical source when the
report from your medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be
resolved, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not
appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques. We may do this by requesting copies of your medical source's records,
a new report, or a more detailed report from your medical source, including your
treating source, or by telephoning your medical source .... We may not seek
additional evidence or clarification from a medical source when we know from
past experience that the source either cannot or will not provide necessary
findings.").
132. See generally Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013).
133. See generally id.
134. See SARAH H. BOHR ET AL., BOHR'S SOCIAL SECURITY ISSUES ANNOTATED
§ 202.6 (rev. vol. 2012).
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recontact provision to a permissive one. Beginning March 26,
2012, ALJs became free to use their discretion in determining
when or if to give claimants' doctors any opportunities to
clarify their opinions before they were simply rejected.135 The
Regulations pertaining to recontacting now read as follows:
(c) If the evidence is consistent but we have insufficient evidence to
determine whether you are disabled, or if after weighing the
evidence we determine we cannot reach a conclusion about whether
you are disabled, we will determine the best way to resolve the
inconsistency or insufficiency. The action(s) we take will depend on
the nature of the inconsistency or insufficiency. We will try to
resolve the inconsistency or insufficiency by taking any one or more
of the actions listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this
section. We might not take all of the actions listed below. We will
consider any additional evidence we receive together with the
evidence we already have.
(1) We may recontact your treating physician, psychologist, or other
medical source. We may choose not to seek additional evidence or
clarification from a medical source if we know from experience that
the source either cannot or will not provide the necessary
evidence....;
(2) We may request additional existing records;
(3) We may ask you to undergo a consultative examination at our
expense; or
(4) We may ask you or others for more information. 136
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Notice"), SSA
claimed that the amendment to the recontact Regulation
would be beneficial to the adjudicatory process. 137
Specifically, SSA contended, "[b]y giving adjudicators more
flexibility in determining how best to obtain [the information
needed to resolve an inconsistency or insufficiency in the
medical source's evidence], we will be able to make a
determination or decision on disability claims more quickly
135. 77 Fed. Reg. 10651, 10655 (Feb. 23, 2012).
136. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (2013).
137. How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 76 Fed. Reg. 20,282,
20,282 (proposed Apr. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416).
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and efficiently in certain situations."'38  SSA further
contended that "there may be other, more appropriate
sources from whom we could obtain the information we
need."3 9
Interestingly, despite the fact that ALJs were regularly
failing to comply with the recontact provision when it was
mandatory, SSA reasoned in its Notice:
Although we propose to eliminate the requirement that we
recontact your medical source(s) first when we need to resolve an
inconsistency or insufficiency he or she provided, we expect that our
adjudicators would continue to recontact your medical source(s)
when we believe such recontact is the most effective and efficient
way to resolve an inconsistency or insufficiency. For example, if we
have a report from one of your medical sources that contains a
functional assessment of your physical capacity for work, but no
clinical or objective findings in support, we expect that the
adjudicator would first contact that source to find out the reasons
for his or her assessment. Similarly, when the medical evidence we
receive from one of your medical sources contains an internal
inconsistency about an issue relevant to our disability
determination, we would also expect that our adjudicator would
contact that source to resolve the inconsistency.140
Therefore, SSA still "expects" its adjudicators to
recontact sources first and foremost at times when those
sources' opinions or records are insufficient or inconsistent
even though the adjudicators are no longer required to do so
by the Regulations. 141 If SSA still "expects" its adjudicators to
recontact medical sources first in these circumstances, why
did SSA not amend the Regulation to reflect a mandatory
recontact requirement in this regard? Moreover, if SSA still
"expects" its adjudicators to recontact medical sources in
these circumstances, when would SSA expect adjudicators to
not recontact medical sources first?
In its Notice, SSA provided only two examples to clarify
the circumstances where the discretion newly granted to the
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 20,283 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
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adjudicators by the amendment would come in handy.'42
First, SSA explained that when a claimant's medical source
does not specialize in the area of the impairment alleged and
when SSA needs more evidence about the impairment's
current severity, "[SSA] may supplement the evidence in
[the] case record by obtaining a CE 43 with a specialist (such
as a pulmonologist) who can perform the type of examination
[needed] in order to determine whether [the claimant] is
disabled under [SSA's] rules."' 44 Second, SSA argued that if
medical records contain a reference to a claimant returning
to work, it would be more appropriate to contact the claimant
himself for verification instead of the author of the medical
records and, further, the claimant could directly provide
information such as schedules, earning, and job duties.' 45
SSA argued that in a case like the former, contacting the
medical source first for clarification could cause undue delay
in the adjudication of the case. 46
B. The Fallacies in SSA's Rationale and the Repercussions
of the Amendment
The Social Security trust fund is a hot topic 47 these days,
and it will continue to be one as we near the predicted
depletion date. The Social Security Disability Insurance
("DI") program's trust fund is in the most dire straits.1 48 "DI
142. Id.
143. "CE" stands for "consultative examination." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(a)-(t)
(2013).
144. How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 76 Fed. Reg. 20,282,
20,283 (proposed Apr. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social Security Reform: Does Privatization
Still Make Sense?, 50 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 173-74 (2013); David Kamin, Risky
Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723, 765 (2013);
Daniel Shaviro, Should Social Security and Medicare Be More Market-Based?, 21
ELDER L.J. 87, 113 (2013); Benjamin A. Templin, Social Security Reform: The
Politics of the Payroll Tax, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 4 (2013).
148. See Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of
the 2013 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/
trsum/trl3summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
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Trust Fund reserves expressed as a percent of annual cost
(the trust fund ratio) declined to eighty-five percent at the
beginning of 2013, and the Trustees project trust fund
depletion in 2016."'' 14 Perhaps it is the stress of the ever-
emptying reserves that has caused SSA to amend the
recontact Regulations. Maybe SSA thinks that by allowing
more discretion regarding recontacting medical sources, they
can shorten case processing time and conserve resources. 150 1
posit that SSA could not be more wrong. Not only will the
new permissive recontact Regulation lengthen case
processing time and result in a greater depletion of resources,
it will deprive claimants of "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination[s]"'51  of their cases while encouraging
adjudicators to overstep the bounds of legal decision-making.
1. SSA's Expectations that ALJs Will, of Their Own
Volition, Recontact Medical Sources First are Misguided.
Why would SSA "expect" ALJs to voluntarily recontact
medical sources? The better question is, what evidence does
SSA have that makes it so confident, to the extent that it has
the audacity to change a mandatory requirement to a
permissive one, that ALJs will recontact the way that they
should? As painfully evidenced by the Second Circuit's
holding in Selian, ALJs still do not have a solid grasp of when
they should be recontacting claimants' medical sources
because they are still getting it wrong. That is my optimistic
interpretation of Selian. Another interpretation of Selian is
that some ALJs simply choose not to recontact medical
sources even when they know that they should do so. Instead,
these bold ALJs skirt the law and decide to substitute their
own lay opinions for that of licensed medical professionals in
deciding disability claims.
Looking first at my more optimistic assessment, Selian's
ALJ failed to recontact Selian's medical sources in the most
fundamental ways, the ways in which SSA contends are such
obvious examples of situations where ALJs are "expected" to
149. Id.
150. How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 76 Fed. Reg. 20,282,
20,282-83 (proposed Apr. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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recontact medical sources first. Dr. Corey provided an RFC
assessment that was consistent with an inability to perform
substantial gainful activity on a sustained basis. 52 Dr. Corey
also specifically diagnosed fibromyalgia and documented
clinical findings supporting his diagnosis. 53 Further, a
specialist in Selian's impairment, rheumatologist Dr. Dura,
also diagnosed fibromyalgia. 5 4 Despite the seemingly
consistent medical evidence, the ALJ perceived
inconsistencies and discredited Dr. Corey's medical opinion
without any attempt to obtain clarification and/or more
information from Dr. Corey regarding his medical opinion. 55
Selian exemplifies the need for a mandatory recontact
regulation. Without it, ALJs will feel even less pressure to
recontact claimants' medical sources. The permissive
recontact Regulation naturally sends the message to ALJs
that recontacting sources for the purposes of developing a full
and fair case record is being de-emphasized by SSA. This
would truly be a detriment to the reliable adjudication of
disability claims because a claimant's medical sources are
generally in the best position to evaluate the claimant. 156
Turning to the less optimistic version, the permissive
recontact Regulation makes it even easier for ALJs who
already have a tendency of using their own opinion or biases
to evaluate disability claims to perpetuate that behavior.
Recently, the Office of Disability Adjudication & Review 57
located in Jamaica, New York, ("Jamaica ODAR") came
under fire for being biased against Social Security disability
claimants.'58 The Urban Justice Center and Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of thousands
152. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 2013).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 419.
156. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2014).
157. Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/
about odar.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
158. Sam Dolnick, Suit Alleges Bias in Disability Denials by Queens Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at A23.
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of New Yorkers on April 12, 2011.159 The complaint alleges
that five out of the eight ALJs from the Jamaica ODAR
deprived claimants of a "full and fair hearing" by
conduct[ing] adversarial hearings, routinely cherry-pick[ing] and
manipulat[ing] facts to support their preordained conclusions,
willfully ignor[ing] established law, even with explicit instructions
from federal district courts and the Social Security Appeals
Council, disregard[ing] evidence from treating physicians,
engag[ing] in bullying and unprofessional behavior, thwart[ing]
meaningful review of their decisions by deliberately failing to
develop the evidentiary record, and effectively hold[ing] claimants
to a higher evidentiary standard than what is set forth by law. 160
Notably, each of the five ALJs were accused of essentially
acting like doctors and failing to develop the administrative
record by recontacting the claimant's medical sources.
According to the complaint, AM David Nisnewitz was
found to have committed error in ten district court cases since
January 1, 2008.161 In one case, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York ("Eastern
District") noted that ALJ Nisnewitz was instructed by the
Second Circuit to resolve inconsistencies in the record
regarding the opinions of two physicians, yet AM Nisnewitz
failed to do so, even on remand from the Second Circuit.
162
Instead of sending the case back for another hearing, the
Eastern District simply awarded benefits.1 63 In another case,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ("Southern District") found that AM Nisnewitz
159. Historic Class Action Settlement Provides New Hearings and Protections to
Thousands of Disabled New Yorkers Wrongly Denied Social Security Benefits,
GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/
HistoricClassActionSettlementProvidesNewHearingsandProtections.aspx
[hereinafter Historic Class Action Settlement].
160. Amended Complaint at 2-3, Padro v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-1788 (CBA) (RLM)
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91277 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Padro Complaint].
161. Id. at 24 (No. 11-CV-1788).
162. Id. at 26 (No. 11-CV-1788); see also Larkins v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-1700
(NG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90129, at *32 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
Significantly, this case stretched over twelve years. Clearly, had this ALJ
developed the record in the way he should have originally, there would have been
a massive amount of time and resources saved.
163. Larkins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90129, at *33.
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"failed to meet his responsibility to resolve ambiguities or
evidentiary gaps in the record.' ' 64 The Southern District
remanded the case based on ALJ Nisnewitz's "plain error."'' 65
In yet another case, the Eastern District found that ALJ
Nisnewitz "should have examined the physician's treatment
records and addressed any remaining questions or doubts to
that physician."'' 66 As a result of ALJ Nisnewitz's failures, the
case was remanded.167
ALJ Cofresi was also faulted for too often relying on his
own lay opinion. 68 Since January 1, 2008, ALJ Cofresi was
found to have committed error in fourteen cases. 169 In one
case, the Eastern District accused him of "read[ing]
conclusions into the Medical Expert's testimony that are not
supported therein. '170 In another case, the Eastern District
found that ALJ Cofresi "failed in his fundamental duty 'to
elicit further supporting information' before rejecting a
doctor's medical opinion."' 7' In still another case, the Eastern
District found that "ALJ Cofresi disregarded medical
testimony because of inconsistencies in, or an absence of,
those physicians' medical records" and 'failed' or 'made no
attempt' to get the records."'' 72
164. Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 27; see also Baldwin v. Astrue, No. 07-
Civ. 6958 (RJH) (MHD), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125638, at *71 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22,
2009).
165. Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 27.
166. Id. at 28-29 (No. 11-CV-1788); see also Smith v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-4999
(JG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34367, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011).
167. Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 29.
168. Id. at 34 (No. 11-CV-1788).
169. Id. (No. 11-CV-1788).
170. Id. at 35 (No. 11-CV-1788); see also Day v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-157 (RJD),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008).
171. Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 35; see also Taylor v. Astrue, No. CV-
07-3469 (FB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46619, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008).
172. Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 36; see also Lopez v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 08-CV-4787 (CPS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81214, at *55-56 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 8, 2009).
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Each of the three other ALJs exhibited a comparable
level of disregard for medical evidence. '73 I see no need to
detail their failures here any further. I will tell you though
that at the time the lawsuit commenced, the Jamaica ODAR
was ranked third in the nation for denials of Social Security
benefits.'7 4 As far as reversals, more than eighty percent of
the decisions issued by the five named ALJs were reversed
on appeal.'75 On October 18, 2013, the Eastern District
approved a settlement agreement, which provided that SSA
would "take certain actions on all unfavorable and partially
favorable decisions issued by the five ALJs through a
specified time period."'7 6 Basically, under the settlement,
thousands of New Yorkers who were denied benefits by any
of the five ALJs will get to have their cases heard again.1 7
The Queens ODAR disaster is a prime, though extreme,
example of how relaxing the recontact requirement will lead
to expending more of SSA's limited time and resources in the
long run. Cutting corners on properly adjudicating claims in
earlier stages will leave more work for our federal courts to
handle on appeal. For that matter, even cases that do not
progress to the federal court level will still waste time and
resources simply by progressing through the administrative
appeals system. Moreover, claimants will be denied the
benefits that they need for however long it takes for the
courts to get things right.
2. Both Circumstances that SSA Cites as Examples Where
a Permissive Recontact Provision Would Be Beneficial Are
Unrealistic Situations. As stated above, in its Notice, SSA
cited two examples of situations where ALJs need the
freedom to decide who to contact to resolve insufficiencies or
173. See Padro Complaint, supra note 160, at 42-66.
174. Historic Class Action Settlement, supra note 159.
175. Id.
176. HALLEXI-5-4-71, SoC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa.gov/OPHomefhallex/I-05/1-
5-4-71.html#i-5-4-71-ii (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
177. See Historic Class Action Settlement Provides New Hearings and
Protections to Thousands of Disabled New Yorkers Wrongly Denied Social
Security Benefits, supra note 159.
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inconsistencies in the evidence.'78 First, where a claimant's
medical source is not a specialist in the area of the claimant's
impairment, SSA argued that ALJs should be free to order a
consultative examination by a specialist instead of
recontacting the claimant's medical source. 179 For example,
suppose a claimant treats only with a family practitioner, but
the claimant alleges severe pulmonary impairments. In that
case, SSA wants an ALJ to be able to order a pulmonary
consultative examination (which presumably would include
pulmonary function tests) instead of first wasting time
recontacting the family practitioner who would likely be
unable to perform such tests anyway. However, SSA did not
need to amend the recontact Regulation to accomplish that
effect. Under the former recontact Regulations, ALJs did not
have to first recontact a claimant's medical source if the ALJ
had reason to believe that the claimant's medical source
could not provide the necessary evidence. 180 Moreover, the
Regulations that dictate when a consultative examination
will be purchased also provides clear evidence that ALJs can
order consultative examinations when "[h]ighly technical or
specialized medical evidence" is needed but is not available
from a claimant's medical sources. 8 ' Significantly, the
consultative examination Regulations only require that
consideration be given first to whether the additional
information is readily available from the records of the
claimant's medical sources-after due consideration, not
after recontacting, an ALJ is free to order a consultative
examination after determining that the information cannot
be obtained from the claimant's medical sources. For this
reason, SSA's rationale for the need of the permissive
recontact Regulation is unreasonable.
178. How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 76 Fed. Reg. 20,282,
20,283 (proposed Apr. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416).
179. Id.
180. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(2) (1996) (amended by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)
(2013)) ("We may not seek additional evidence or clarification from a medical
source when we know from past experience that the source either cannot or will
not provide the necessary findings.").
181. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(b)(3) (2013).
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The only other circumstance provided by SSA as a reason
why the recontact Regulation had to be amended was
regarding records that indicated a claimant had returned to
work. SSA argued that it would be "more appropriate" to
contact the claimant himself instead of the author of the
records; SSA explained that it would want "to obtain any
related information, such as [the claimant's] schedule,
earnings, and job duties."'82 This rationale fails for two
reasons.
First, when a claimant files a claim for Social Security
disability benefits, a claimant is required to complete an
array of forms.'83 These forms become part of the
administrative record, and many of them require a claimant
to provide information regarding his schedule, earnings, and
job duties.8 4 Therefore, an ALJ need not contact a claimant
to obtain information regarding any of the aforementioned
topics because it is already part of the administrative record.
Second, it is always possible that a claimant may be working
"off the books." A claimant working in that way would likely
be reluctant to provide that information to an ALJ if asked.
However, a claimant may disclose that he injured himself
working to a doctor who would then notate the claimant's
medical records accordingly. Therefore, I believe that a doctor
could provide special insight into the true work status of a
claimant, and that insight could only be obtained by
recontacting the doctor who authored the medical records. An
ALJ would likely receive the same information obtained
through SSA's intake forms as the ALJ would receive from
contacting the claimant regarding a reference to work in the
claimant's medical records. Obviously it would then be
beneficial to get a third party's input regarding the claimant's
work status.
182. How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 76 Fed. Reg. 20,282,
20,283 (Apr. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416).
183. See, e.g., Form SSA-3368, SSA-3369, SSA-820, SSA-821, available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/forms (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
184. See id.
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3. Reforming the Recontact Regulation. ALJs need to be
reminded that they are not doctors. This can only be
accomplished by implementing safeguards throughout the
Regulations that guide their evaluations of disability claims.
When confronted with a record that contains insufficient
evidence upon which to base a decision, ALJs should be
required to recontact a claimant's medical sources to obtain
the needed information. Moreover, when the claimant's
medical sources have provided inconsistent information or
ambiguous information, ALJs should be required to develop
the record by recontacting those sources to obtain
clarification. Before relying on consultative examinations,
which are often performed by doctors who have not had the
opportunity to establish a longitudinal relationship with the
claimant, it should be mandated that ALJs appeal first to the
claimant's medical sources.
But I recommend that the recontact requirement not
simply be reinstated as it stood before the amendment. The
recontact requirement should be strengthened: it should
specifically delineate the circumstances under which an ALJ
should recontact a claimant's medical sources. The former
recontact requirement was apparently unable to convey to
ALJs the grounds that mandated recontacting a claimant's
medical sources.
Further, the Regulations should incorporate a
documenting requirement that is currently only pre-
regulatory.'85 Whenever efforts are made to develop a case
record, adjudicators should be required to document such
efforts in a case development summary. This document
should be made available to claimants and their
representatives. This will create more accountability in the
case development system and should encourage ALJs to
fulfill their affirmative duties.
CONCLUSION
In Selian v. Astrue, the Second Circuit reiterated many
of the points it has been making for decades. Primarily, the
Second Circuit emphasized an ALJ's duty to develop a full
185. See DI 22505.008 Developing Supplemental Evidence, Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422505008 (last updated June 25, 2013).
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and fair case record, all the while paying special deference to
opinions provided by a claimant's treating medical sources.
The Second Circuit also cautioned that ALJs must refrain
from substituting their own lay opinions for that of
competent medical opinions; they should instead make the
effort to obtain clarification and/or more information from
professional medical sources. Selian coupled with SSA's
recent settlement in Padro v. Astrue demonstrate that ALJs
still are not evaluating and developing evidence in the ways
that they should. The unintended consequence of Selian is
that it makes a mockery of SSA's rationale behind its recent
amendment to the Regulations, which actually expands an
ALJ's discretion in evaluating and developing evidence. If
SSA truly wants to shorten case processing time and
conserve resources, it should strengthen the recontact
Regulation by making it a mandatory requirement instead of
weakening it by making it a permissive one.
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